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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all parties to the
proceedings in the district court.
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CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES, PROVISIONS, AND RULES
None

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals a summary judgment dismissal. This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented to the Court for review, together with the
respective standards of review:
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Issue. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment when there was a contested material issue of fact regarding whether
or not plaintiffs reliance upon defendants' fraudulent representations was unreasonable?
Preserved for Appeal at 136-149.
Standard of Review. The Court of Appeals should review this case de novo.
Winegarv.Froerer. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Other than case law, there is no dispositive statutory authority.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On September 7, 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendants had sold
him a truck which they fraudulently and negligently represented, prior to plaintiff signing
the contract, to have a new engine (TR 1-4). After a year and several months of litigation
a pretrial conference was held on January 10, 2001 (TR 98). Trial had been set for April

16, 2001. At the pretrial conference, despite the passing of the dispositive motions cutoff date of October 9, 2000 (TR 94-95), defendants requested that they be permitted to
file a Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court set aside the dispositive motion cutoff date and allowed defendants to file their Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants
filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on January 12, 2001 and requested a hearing on
the motion. The motion was fully briefed by both parties on January 29, 2001. Without
granting oral argument, the trial court issued its ruling on February 22, 2001. The first
final judgment was signed on April 2, 2001. However, the court did not rule on the issue
of attorney's fees and refused to do so. Plaintiff then appealed the matter. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal as premature. The second final judgment was signed on
January 6, 2003 which eliminated the issue on attorney's fees. The second notice of
appeal was then filed on approximately January 23, 2003. Plaintiff then filed this current
appeal.
Defendants raised three issues in their Motion for Summary Judgment. The first is
whether or not the merger doctrine and the parol evidence rule defeated plaintiffs cause
of action for negligent misrepresentation. Pursuant to Robinson v. Tripco Inc., 2000 Ut
App 200, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 2000), a case that was not cited by defendants
in their motion, these doctrines apply to claims for negligent misrepresentation. In view
thereof, plaintiff conceded that his claim for negligent misrepresentation was not well
taken and does not appeal the dismissal of this cause of action.
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Defendants' other arguments were that plaintiff could not show, as a matter of law,
any evidence of: (1) reasonable reliance, or (2) intent to defraud. As to these issues the
trial court entered its order granting summary judgment against the plaintiff. The trial
court's decision was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court
transferred the current proceeding to the Utah Court of Appeals for further action.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
1.

Defendant Floyd Maestas ("Maestas") is a used car salesman for defendant

Exclusive Cars, Inc. (TR 103).
2.

On December 4, 1998, the plaintiff purchased a 1991 Toyota truck ("truck")

from defendants (TR 103).
3.

In conjunction with the sale, plaintiff executed several documents (TR

4.

The documents indicate that the sale was "AS IS" and NO warranty was

104).

provided (TR 104)
5.

Shortly before the purchase of the truck, plaintiff alleged that Maestas

represented that the truck had a new engine. Plaintiff alleged that Maestas further told
plaintiff that Dahle Toyota in Logan, Utah, installed the new engine (TR 104).
6.

Plaintiff alleged that the truck did not have a new engine (TR 104).

7.

Plaintiff alleged that the truck experienced mechanical failure (TR 104).
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8.

Plaintiff filed this action asserting two causes of action claims for

fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation (TR 104).
9.

When they filed their Motion For Summary Judgment, defendants provided

no factual or legal basis supporting an award of attorney's fees or any argument to the
trial court asserting its alleged right to attorney's fees. The trial court did not award any
attorney's fees in its memorandum decision and order granting defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment (TR 103-114, 150-168, 172-173).
10.

Defendants prepared a proposed judgment including an award of attorney's

fees. Plaintiff objected to defendants' proposed judgment granting defendants' attorney's
fees (TR 176-179, 186-189).
11. When he purchased the truck, plaintiff was a 19-year-old high school graduate
with no experience with automobile mechanics (TR 36, 44, 138-Larsen Depo. p 5 Ins 421, p 65 Ins 3-5).
12. In November 1998, plaintiff went to the defendants' car lot and spoke with
defendants' salesperson Nikki on approximately two occasions to discuss the truck and
test drive it. Plaintiff test drove it once. Nikki never indicated that it had a new engine.
On the test drive, plaintiff neither heard nor saw anything that would have indicated that
the engine had any problems (TR 39-40, 138-Larsen Depo. pp 39-43).
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13. On December 4, 1998, defendant Floyd Maestas, a used car salesperson with
six and one half years of experience, represented before the contract was signed that the
truck had a new engine (TR 35, 37, 138--Larsen Depo. p 4; p 31 In 3-14).
14. On December 4, 1998, defendant Floyd Maestas represented that the truck's
new engine had been installed by Dahle Toyota of Logan. In fact, Maestas wrote the
information as part of the contract paperwork on a post-it note and gave it to the plaintiff
(TR 38, 42, 58, 138-Larsen Depo. pp 34-35, 57-58).
15. The main reason that plaintiff agreed to purchase the truck at the price stated
was because it was represented to have a new engine (TR 45, 138—Larsen Depo. p 77 In
16-25; p 78 In 1-11).
16. After plaintiff took possession of the truck, it broke down on December 17,
1998. There was no indication on the test drive nor when plaintiff took possession that
the engine was not new as represented by Mr. Maestas (TR 39-40, 139 Larsen Depo. pp
39, 43, 45).
17. It was determined that the truck's engine was not new and that it would cost
between $2,500 and $8,600 to fix (TR 43,139-Larsen Depo. pp 62-63).
18. In a conversation Mr. Maestas had with plaintiff in approximately April of
1999, Mr. Maestas admitted that he had told plaintiff before he purchased the truck that
the truck had a new engine (TR 139, 147-149-Maestas Depo. p 46, Ins 16-18; p 47 In 1118; p 50 In 6-13).
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19. Mr. Maestas admitted that he would not tell a customer that a truck had a new
engine unless he had the documents to back it up (TR 139, 146~Maestas Depo. p 12 Ins
22-25).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court erred when it found, as a matter of law, that Mr. Larsen was
unreasonable to rely upon the fraudulent representations of the defendants. This is a
question of fact that cannot be ruled upon by weighing the evidence as the trial court did
in summary judgment. A jury should be allowed to hear the evidence and make its
determination based thereon.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE & THE MERGER DOCTRINE DO NOT
APPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S ASSERTIONS OF FRAUD AND THEREFORE
THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE CONTRACT ARE IRRELEVANT
THERETO
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah
R. Civ. 56(c); see also Heglar Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980);
Bill Brown Realty. Inc. v. Abbott. 562 P.2d 238, 239 (Utah 1977). In this case, it will be
shown that the trial court was incorrect to hold that there were no disputed issues of
material fact and that it misapplied Gold Standard. Inc. v. Getty Oil Co.. 915 P.2d 1060,
1063 (Utah 1996).
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In Robinson v. Tripco Inv.. 2000 Ut App 200, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App.
2000), W.W. & W.B. Gardner. Inc. v. Mann. 680 P.2d 23 (Utah 1984), and Berkeley
Bank v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980), and as cited by defendant in Lamb v.
Bangart 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah 1974), the Utah Courts have conclusively stated that:
All preliminary negotiations, conversations, and verbal agreements are merged in
and superseded by the subsequent written contract, and unless fraud, , . , b e
averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between the parties and its terms
cannot be altered by parol evidence.
In this case fraud has been averred, therefore the merger doctrine and parol
evidence rule do not apply. To prove fraud, plaintiff must demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that: (1) defendant Maestas made a representation about the truck he
sold to plaintiff, (2) the representation concerned a presently existing material fact, (3) the
representation was false, (4) the defendants knew the representation was false, or were
recklessly indifferent as to the truth or falsity of the representation, (5) the defendants'
intent was to induce plaintiff to buy the truck, (6) the plaintiff reasonably relied upon the
representation in ignorance of its falsity, (7) the plaintiff relied upon the representation,
(8) the plaintiff was induced to act by the defendants' misrepresentation, and (9) the
plaintiff has been damaged. Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs.. 739 P.2d 634, 638 (Ct.
App. Utah 1987).
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants asserted that, as to these nine
elements, plaintiff could not produce evidence of "reasonable reliance" or "intent to
defraud." The trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment solely on the finding
-7-

that the plaintiff had not "reasonably relied upon" the defendants' fraudulent
representation.
A,

THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF REASONABLE RELIANCE ON
DEFENDANTS' MISREPRESENTATIONS.
In Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs.. 739 P.2d 634, 639 (Ct. App. Utah 1987),

the Court, in setting aside a trial court's dismissal of a fraud action, explained the concept
of reasonable reliance:
Reasonable reliance must be considered with reference to the facts of each case,
and is usually a question for the jury to determine. Although it is impossible to
draw precise legal boundaries of when reliance is reasonable, the courts have given
some directions. Generally, a Plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive
assertions of fact without independent investigation. It is only where, under
the circumstance, the facts should make it apparent to one of his knowledge
and intelligence, or he has discovered something which should serve a
warning that he is being deceived, that a Plaintiff is required to make his own
investigations
Reliance also has been found reasonable even where a
Plaintiff executes a written agreement in reliance upon verbal promises that
the contrary written provision is not operative, or where a Plaintiff is induced
to refrain from reading the contract." (Emphasis added).
In this case, plaintiff has asserted that defendants, through defendant Maestas, a
used cars salesperson with six and one half years of experience, made a positive assertion
about the truck that Mr. Maestas wanted the plaintiff to purchase, stating that it had a new
engine. Summary of Facts [SOF] above,fflf5, 13-14. Not only did defendant Maestas
represent that the truck had a new engine but that the truck's new engine had been
installed by Dahle Toyota of Logan. SOF f 14. When viewed in the light most favorable
to plaintiff, this comment added credence to defendant Maestas9 statement and caused
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plaintiff to believe Mr. Maestas. Plaintiff did not observe or discover anything when
inspecting the truck or test driving it that would have alerted him that the truck's engine
was not new and that he should conduct an independent investigation. SOF Yf 5, 12, 13,
16. At the time, plaintiff was a nineteen-year-old highschool graduate with no experience
with automobile mechanics. SOF ^ 11. At no time during the negotiations or in the
written contractual paperwork did defendant Maestas ever indicate that his representation
was false nor did he retract his representation.
Because of his youth, education, and non-mechanical background, a jury could
find that plaintiffs reliance was reasonable. In fact, it could even be concluded that once
he had learned that the truck had a new engine, his actions in purchasing the truck "as is"
and declining to purchase a service contract support his reasonably relying on defendants'
misrepresentations. A purchaser of a truck is likely to believe that a truck with a new
engine or one with low milage is a more safe buy as an "as is" purchase. Plaintiff
believed Mr. Maestas was telling the truth and there was nothing to tip him off that he
should have distrusted Mr. Maestas.
In applying "Gold Standard" the trial court stated:
Assuming, as the Court has, that Defendant Maestas, in fact, represented
that the vehicle Plaintiff was purchasing had a new motor, the question is whether
it was reasonable for Plaintiff to rely on that representation without taking
independent steps to verify it in light of contrary written documents. Plaintiff
claims his reliance on Mr. Maestas statement was reasonable notwithstanding 4
separate documents which he received and signed: (a) a "Motor Vehicle Contract
of Sale," which clearly stated that there were no express or implied warranties on
any used vehicles; (b) a waiver of benefits statement declining the offer to
-9-

purchase an extended warranty plan, and acknowledging that he bore "sole
responsibility" for any repairs- (c) a document entitled "Buyer's Guide" (also
referenced in the vehicle Contract of Sale) which was displayed in the vehicle
window and which stated "AS IS-NO WARRANTY" and which also indicated
that no systems were covered by any warranty; and (d) a "DUE BILL" which in
capital letters indicated "ORAL PROMISES ARE NOT BINDING ON THE
DEALER!" along with a handwritten statement below that stating "Nothing else
promised, implied, or expressed " Moreover, although Plaintiff had been advised
by his brother-in-law (prior to concluding the deal) to secure written
documentation of Maestas' representation, Plaintiff made a single request which
was not directly responded to. To the extent that Plaintiffs request yielded some
information (i.e., the name of the dealer that had worked on the vehicle's engine),
Plaintiff then failed to follow-up on the information he was provided orally.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Gold Standard, supra, conclusively
resolves the question of "reasonable reliance" at issue here. "Under the law of
[Utah], a party cannot reasonably rely upon oral statements by the opposing party
in light of contrary written information. No matter how naive or inexperienced
[Plaintiff was], [he] could not close [his] eyes and accept unquestioningly any
representations made to [him]. It was [his] duty to make such investigation and
inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances would dictate." Gold Standard,
915 P.2d at 1068 (citing Rubev v. Wood, 373 P.2d 386, 387-88 (Utah 1962)).
"The one who complains of being injured by.. .false representation cannot
heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him, but has the duty of exercising such
degree of care to protect his own interests as would be exercised by an ordinary,
reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances, and if he fails to do so, is
precluded from holding someone else to account for the consequences of his own
neglect." Gold Standard , at 1069 (quoting Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641
P.2d 124 (Utah 1982)). Plaintiff here was provided not one, but many, "red flags"
which he chose to disregard. Having done so, he must deal with the
"consequences of his own neglect."

The facts of Gold Standard are very different from those in this case and were
misapplied by the trial court. In Gold Standard, the parties, "GSI and Getty," were two
sophisticated business entities, that, "consistently dealt with each other at arm's length."
In Gold, GSI, was told explicitly in subsequent writings that the oral representations made
-10-

in earlier discussions by Getty were no longer valid. As stated above, in this case
defendant Maestas never retracted his representations that the truck had a new engine.
Plaintiff, an unsophisticated teen, with no mechanical experience believed him.
Moreover, unlike Gold Standard, the paperwork plaintiff signed did not ever indicate that
the truck did not have a new engine, it merely indicated that the purchase was "AS IS"
with no warranties.
If Gold Standard were applicable to plaintiffs case, the defendants would have
had to have put in the paperwork that the affirmative assertion that Mr. Maestas's earlier
representation that the car had a new engine was false and should not have been relied on
by the plaintiff. Since there was no information that plaintiff had been given indicating
that Mr. Maestas was defrauding him, there was no duty to make further inquiries or to
follow through and obtain the paperwork as suggested by plaintiffs brother-in-law.
Admittedly, probably the fact most favorable to defendants' position is that one of
the documents that plaintiff signed stated, "ORAL PROMISES ARE NOT BINDING ON
THE DEALER!" Nonetheless, if this statement would mean as a matter of law that
plaintiffs reliance was not reasonable, it would only apply to the dealer and not Mr.
Maestas. Plaintiff would submit that because of the "averred fraud" that this written
statement would still not indicate that there is no disputed material fact.
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The facts of this case are more similar to Cardiomed, Inc. In Cardiomed, Inc. vs.
Tripco Investment, Inc.. 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Ct. App. 2000), a case decided after
Gold Standard. In Cardiomed. the court stated that:
[T]o determine whether the reliance was reasonable, the reliance 'must be
considered with reference to the facts of each case.' Conder, 739 P.2d at 638. In
general, a Plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without
independent investigation. It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts
should make it apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence, or he has
discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is being
deceived, that a Plaintiff is required to make his own investigation. I d . . . .
Applying the foregoing legal principles to the facts of this case, we cannot say as a
matter of law that Cardiomed was unreasonable in its reliance on Tripp's
statements regarding the structural integrity of the building. Viewing the facts in
the light most favorable to Cardiomed, they demonstrate that Robinson walked
through the building with Tripp before Cardiomed purchased it. Robinson
questioned Tripp regarding some problems he observed and Tripp responded that
he had been involved in the construction and engineering of the building, and that
the building had no structural defects. To support that claim, Tripp then provided
Robinson with an inspection report that failed to note any structural problems with
the building. Simply stated, because Tripp held himself out as someone with
superior knowledge of the building and then lent support to his
representations by providing an inspection report, a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to whether Cardiomedfs reliance was reasonable. Accordingly,
because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the three elements of
fraud relied upon, summary judgment on that cause of action was improperly
granted.
Similarly, Mr. Maestas, held himself out as someone with superior knowledge of
the truck's condition and categorically stated that the truck had a new engine, thus
justifying the requested purchase price. Mr. Meaestas went so far as to represent Dahle's
as the place where the new engine had been installed. When viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff, based upon the "[Plaintiffs'] knowledge and
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intelligence/5 and the fact that, as Plaintiff testified that he never "discovered something
which should serve as a warning that he [was) being deceived/' it was reasonable for
him to rely on Mr. Maestas' misrepresentation.
The facts of this case are also more similar to Semenov v. Hill 982 P.2d 578,
(Utah 1999) another case decided after Gold Standard. In Semenov. the court stated that:
Hill contends that, as a matter of law, Semenov's allegations cannot support a
claim of misrepresentation. He asserts that the documentation available at the
closing showed the business to be losing money and that Semenov could not
have relied reasonably upon any oral representations to the contrary. Hill
relies on our decision in Gold Standard as disposing of Semenov's claim that
language difficulties can create a triable issue of fact that would be material to a
fraud claim. Hill relies on the statement in Gold Standard that "under the law of
this state, a party cannot reasonably rely upon oral statements by the opposing
party in light of contrary written information" to support his claim that a dispute
over Semenov's English proficiency is not a dispute over a "material" fact. 915
P.2datl068.
Gold Standard is inapposite. That case did not involve a party asserting a
language deficiency; rather, it involved two sophisticated parties proficient in
English. Here, the question of Semenov1 s language capability is material to his
fraud claim. It is true that the general rule pertaining to acceptance of an offer by
signing is that "where a person signs a document, he is not permitted to show that
he did not know its terms, and in the absence of fraud or mistake he will be
bound by all its provisions, even though he has not read the agreement and does
not know its contents." 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 41(f) (1963) (emphasis added); see
also id. § 139; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 157 cmt. b (1981). However,
it is also true that "the illiteracy of a party has an important bearing on the
question of the existence of fraud in procuring [a] signature/' 17 C.J.S.
Contracts § 139 (1963). Semenov's English proficiency or the lack thereof is a
material fact that "should be considered in determining whether or not he has
been defrauded." Id.
Because Semenov and Hill disagree on the state of Semenov's English
proficiency at the time of the closing, a factual dispute exists which must be
resolved by a jury or a judge after an evidentiary hearing. Our decision to remand
-13-

this case is consistent with Heuter v. Coastal Airlines Inc., where a New Jersey
court overturned a summary judgment in favor of the defendant and held that a
jury should decide whether an uneducated and illiterate non-English-speaking
Plaintiff should be bound to a release form he signed with an airline when the
contents of the writing were unknown to him. 12 N.J. Super. 490, 79 A.2d 880,
883 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951).
Again, similarly, defendants' claim that, "the documentation available at the
closing [of the sale of the car] showed the [car was sold as is with no warranties] and
that [Plaintiff] could not have relied reasonably upon any oral representations to the
contrary." Nevertheless, like Semenov's illiteracy, Plaintiff was an unsophisticated
nineteen-year-old. Moreover, unlike this case, in Semenov, the court noted that the Gold
Standard case "involved two sophisticated parties proficient in English. Here, the
question of [Plaintiffs inexperience] is material to his fraud claim."
B.

THERE IS EVIDENCE OF AN INTENT TO DEFRAUD OR DECEIVE.
To maintain a cause of action for fraud, plaintiff must prove that Maestas either

knew his representation was false or made the representation recklessly knowing that
there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base the representation.
In Galloway v. AFCO Dev. Corp., 777 P.2d 506, 508 (Ct. App. Utah 1989) the
court stated that:
Intentional fraud generally requires a showing of intent to deceive, that is, the
misrepresented intent to induce the victim's reliance on the false representation.
The intent to deceive, required for common law fraud, may be inferred where
a misrepresentation is voluntarily communicated to the victim with
knowledge that it is false, or without knowing whether it is true or false but
knowing that the victim is likely to rely on it. Thus . . . it is sometimes said that
a "reckless" misrepresentation, made "knowing that the [the misrepresenter] had
-14-

insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a misrepresentation" is
tantamount to the intent to deceive.
Also, in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), the court favorably cited an
Idaho case for the holding that under the doctrine of constructive fraud the vendor of
goods or land has a special duty to know the truth of his representations and is presumed
to know the facts to which his representations relate. Consequently, a misrepresentation
made by such a vendor is fraudulent even if not made knowingly, willfully or with actual
intent to deceive.
Here, plaintiff has alleged that he made several trips to the defendants' car lot. In
his first trips he dealt with salesperson Nikki who never mentioned that the truck had a
new engine. Then, after several negotiations in which plaintiff insisted that the price was
too high, Mr. Maestas then indicated that the truck had a new engine. In his deposition,
Mr. Maestas acknowledged that he would not make such a representation unless he had
documents to back himself up. Hence, he himself establishes fact that if plaintiff s
assertions are found to be true by the Jury, his actions were at the very least reckless.
It is well understood in our mobile society that an engine is an integral part of an
automobile. Mr. Maestas, a used car salesperson for many years, knew that this
misrepresentation would clinch the deal and induce Mr. Larsen to agree to purchase the
automobile at the higher purchase price. Hence, "the intent to deceive, required for
common law fraud, may be inferred where a misrepresentation is voluntarily
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communicated to the victim . . . without knowing whether it is true or false but
knowing that the victim is likely to rely on it."
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff/appellant respectfully requests that this case be remanded to the trial
court and that he be allowed to proceed with his cause of action for fraud.
DATED this jl)

day of March, 2003.
ARROW LEGAL SOLUTIONS, LLC.
'v

./

V
oren M. Lafnbert
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document on
March \ ^ , 2003, postage prepaid to:
Nick J. Colessides
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696)
Attorneys at Law
466 South 400 East, # 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325
Tele: 801.521-4441
Fax: 801.521-4452
Attorneys for Defendants
Exclusive Cars, Inc., and Floyd Maestas
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY L. LARSEN
Plaintiff,

:
:

AMENDED ^JUDGMENT pXP^i__J^

vs.
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a Utah
corporation, and FLOYD
MAESTAS,
:

Case No.:

99 04 08099

:

Judge: Denise P. Lindberg

Defendants.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment having come
regularly for consideration and decision before the Honorable
Denise P. Lindberg, and the Court having received the submissions
of the parties: to-wit; the various memoranda and attached
exhibits thereto, in support of each party's position, and the
Court having considered the submissions of the parties, and the
Court having made and entered its Decision and Order on

defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, which decision, order,
and findings, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof by
this reference, and the Court having found:

that plaintiff

Wesley L. Larsen did not act reasonably in relying upon the oral
representations of co-defendant Floyd Maestas, despite having
been provided with many flags and ignoring the same, and
plaintiff was neglectful in failing to follow up in an inquiry to
determine the veracity of the information orally presented by codefendant Floyd Maestas, and having received from co-defendant
Exclusive Cars, Inc., the automobile dealer, four separate and
distinct documents disclaiming oral representations, and the
Court having entered its order granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and good cause otherwise appearing therefor,
now upon motion of Nick J. Colessides, attorney for defendants
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff's
complaint be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice, no
cause of action.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SANDY DEPARTMENT
)

WESLEY L.LARSEN,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

vs.
EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., a
Utah corporation, and FLOYD
MAESTAS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civ. No. 990408099

) _

Defendants have moved this Court for Summary Judgment and filed a Memorandum of Law in
support of their motion. Plaintiff has responded and Defendants have replied to Plaintiffs
opposition. Defendants have requested oral argument. However, after reviewing the parties'
submissions and applicable case law, it is the Court's view that the dispositive issue governing the
granting or denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided. Accordingly, oral argument is
not necessary.
Plaintiffs complaint alleged bothfraudulentand negligent misrepresentation. In his opposition to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, however, Plaintiff conceded that under the authority
of Robinson v. Tripco Inv.. 2000 Ut. App. 200, his claim for negligent misrepresentation "must
fail." Consequently the only issues for the Court are whether (1) there are material issues of fact
that preclude summary judgment on thefraudulentmisrepresentation claim, or (2) if no material
issues of fact are in dispute, whether Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah
R. Civ. P. 56.
Plaintiff has agreed with Defendants' statement of undisputed facts. In his opposition, however,
Plaintiff raises additional factual statements, some of which (paragraphs 1-3) are accepted without
dispute by Defendants, others of which (paragraphs 4-8) are disputed in whole or in part by
Defendants. The Court hereby incorporates by reference all the undisputed facts noted in
Defendants' and Plaintiffs memoranda. Furthermore, for purposes of ruling on this motion the
Court accepts as true Plaintiffs version of the disputed facts. Notwithstanding this assumption,
the Court concludes that, as a matter of law, Defendants must prevail.
Plaintiffs remaining cause of action (forfraudulentmisrepresentation) requires that Plaintiff
establish the following elements: (1) that a representation was made, (2) concerning a presently
existing material fact, (3) which was false, and (4) which the representor either knew to be false,
or made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a
representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it, and (6) that the
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did, in fact, rely upon it, (8) and was

thereby induced to act, (9) to that party's injury and damage. Gold Standard Inc.. v. Getty Oil
915 P.2d 1060, 1067 (Utah 1996). This Court is mindful that "[w]hile the question of reasonable
reliance is usually a matter within the province of the jury... there are instances where courts
may conclude that, as a matter of law, there was no reasonable reliance." Id, The Court holds as
a matter of law that, on the facts of this case, it was not reasonable for Plaintiff to act as he did.
Assuming, as the Court has, that Defendant Maestas,in fact, represented that the vehicle Plaintiff
was purchasing had a new motor, the question is whether it was reasonable for Plaintiff to rely on
that representation without taking independent steps to verify it in light of contrary written
documents. Plaintiff claims his reliance on Mr. Maestas statement was reasonable notwithstanding
4 separate documents which he received and signed: (a) a "Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale,"
which clearly stated that there were no express or implied warranties on any used vehicles; (b) a
waiver of benefits statement declining the offer to purchase an extended warranty plan, and
acknowledging that he bore "sole responsibility" for any repairs; (c) a document entitled "Buyer's
Guide" (also referenced in the vehicle Contract of Sale) which was displayed in the vehicle
window and which stated "AS IS-NO WARRANTY" and which also indicated that no systems
were covered by any warranty; and (d) a "DUE BILL" which in capital letters indicated "ORAL
PROMISES ARE NOT BINDING ON THE DEALER!" along with a handwritten statement
below that stating "Nothing else promised, implied, or expressed." Moreover, although Plaintiff
had been advised by his brother-in-law (prior to concluding the deal) to secure written
documentation of Maestas' representation, Plaintiff made a single request which was not directly
responded to. To the extent that Plaintiff's request yielded some information (i.e., the name of
the dealer that had worked on the vehicle's engine), Plaintiff then Med to follow-up on the
information he was provided orally.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Gold Standard, supra, conclusively resolves the question
of "reasonable reliance" at issue here. "Under the law of [Utah], a party cannot reasonably rely
upon oral statements by the opposing party in light of contrary written information. No matter
how naive or inexperienced [Plaintiff was], [he] could not close [his] eyes and accept
unquestioningly any representations made to [him]. It was [his] duty to make such investigation
and inquiry as reasonable care under the circumstances would dictate." Gold Standard. 915 P.2d
at 1068 (citing Rubev v. Wood. 373 P.2d 386, 387-88 (Utah 1962)). "The one who complains of
being injured b y . . . false representation cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever is told him, but
has the duty of exercising such degree of care to protect his own interests as would be exercised
by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances, and if he fails to do so, is
precluded from holding someone else to account for the consequences of his own neglect." Gold
Standard, at 1069 (quoting Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty. 641 P.2d 124 (Utah 1982)).
Plaintiff here was provided not one, but many, "redflags"which he chose to disregard. Having
done so, he must deal with the "consequences of his own neglect."
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is G R A N T E ^ ^ ^ ^ S f i ^ i s disposition, the trial
dates are stricken. So ordered.
Dated this 21* day of February, 2001.
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